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remuneration, but only in countries with stronger investor protection. 
Finding evidence of a relation only in stronger investor protection coun- 
tries is consistent with the more prominent role of audited financial 
statements for investors’ decisions in these countries. In settings in 
which investors are less likely to rely on audited financial statements 
and instead rely on alternative sources of information (i.e.,  in countries 
with weaker investor protection), the impact of client-auditor bonding 
should have less of an effect on investors’ decisions. 
1. Introduction 
In this paper, we hypothesize that audits can affect the perceived credibility 
of financial statements and therefore can have an effect on firms’ implied 
required rate of return (IRR) on equity capital. Presumably, audits lower firms’ 
IRR by providing assurance to investors that reported amounts are reliable. How- 
ever, when auditors’ fees represent excess payment for services, investors may 
perceive that the auditor has an economic bond with the client. This bonding, 
whether real or just perceived, could reduce investors’ beliefs that the auditor 
will act independently, thereby weakening the perceived credibility of financial 
statement information and increasing information risk. To test this idea, we 
examine the relation between excess auditor remuneration and IRR. 
Furthermore, we expect the relation between auditor remuneration and 
IRR to vary across countries. Research shows that supporting country-level 
factors (e.g., securities regulation) play a role in firms’ IRR. For example, Hail 
and Leuz (2006) show that firms in countries with stronger investor protection 
tend to have lower IRR. Their findings suggest that firm-level governance 
(e.g.. audited financial statements) cannot fully substitute for weaknesses in 
country-level institutions. When country-level institutions are weaker, firm- 
level governance has less ability to affect investors’ decisions, as it lacks cred- 
ibility (Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz [2007]). In contrast, when country-level 
institutions are stronger, factors that affect the perceived credibility of audited 
financial statements (e.g., excess auditor remuneration) will be more meaning- 
ful to investors. For this reason, we expect the positive relation between excess 
auditor remuneration and IRR to be more significant in countries with stronger 
investor protection. 
We measure excess auditor remuneration as the residuals from a regression 
of total remuneration on an extensive number of firm- and country-level charac- 
teristics expected to influence auditor fees. Our model explains 72 percent of the 
variation in total auditor remuneration. Following extant research, we measure 
IRR as the average estimate from four ex ante cost of equity capital models. The 
evidence suggests that excess auditor remuneration relates positively to IRR and 
is consistent with our notion that the increase in IRR occurs because investors 
perceive excess auditor remuneration to represent economic bonding between the 
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auditor and the client. We also find that the relation between excess auditor 
remuneration and IRR varies with the degree of investor protection across coun- 
tries. Specifically, we find a positive relation between excess auditor remunera- 
tion and IRR in stronger investor protection countries, but we find no relation in 
weaker investor protection countries. This finding supports the greater role of 
firm-specific governance through audits in countries with stronger legal systems 
(Francis, Khurana, Martin, and Pereira [2006]). To the extent that investors rely 
on audited financial statements, IRR will be more sensitive to the perceived 
quality of the audit. When audited financial statements do not play a primary 
role in investors’ decisions (i.e., in countries with weaker investor protection), 
the quality of the audit will have less of an impact on IRR. 
Our results are robust to including an extensive set of control variables. 
Specifically, in addition to controlling for other audit properties (auditor size 
and auditor industry specialization), we control for country-level investor pro- 
tection and disclosure scores, year and industry effects, risk-free interest rates, 
and six other firm-level variables (firm size, book-to-market ratio, market beta, 
price momentum, idiosyncratic risk, and analysts’ earnings forecast dispersion). 
In addition, we subject our tests to a number of sensitivity and specification 
checks. With respect to auditor remuneration, we investigate audit fees versus 
nonaudit fees for a sample of U.K. and U.S. firms, we examine positive and 
negative excess fees separately, we control for potential simultaneity between 
IRR and auditor remuneration, and we examine changes in excess fees. We test 
whether our results are sensitive to our particular measure of investor protec- 
tion and to different ways of averaging the four ex ante cost of equity capital 
measures that make up IRR. Our conclusions are robust to these and several 
other tests. 
In Section 2, we discuss the background for this study and develop hypothe- 
ses. In Section 3, we explain the empirical models. In Section 4, we describe the 
sample. In Section 5 ,  we discuss the main results and our robustness tests. 
Finally, in Section 6, we provide conclusions. 
2. Background and Hypotheses Development 
Our study focuses on two research questions: (1) To what extent does audi- 
tor remuneration relate to firms’ IRR? (2) Does this relation vary based on the 
strength of investor protection in the firm’s country of domicile? 
The link between auditor remuneration and IRR can be understood by first 
considering the role of an audit and its impact on information risk. Audits lend 
credibility to accounting information by providing independent verification of 
manager-prepared financial statements (e.g., Simunic and Stein [ 19871). Levitt 
(2000), among others, argues that investors cannot be expected to trust a com- 
pany’s reported financial information without confidence in the auditor’s objec- 
tivity and fairness. An audit’s ability to improve the credibility of financial 
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accounting information lowers investors’ perceived information risk (e.g.. Boone, 
Khurana, and Raman [2005]). However, to the extent that investors perceive the 
audit to be deficient (e.g., lacking auditor independence), the credibility of financial 
information will decrease and information risk will increase. As this information 
risk may not be diversified away, the f i i ’ s  cost of equity capital will increase 
(Bhattacharya, Daouk, and Welker [2003]; Easley and O’Hara [2004]; Francis, 
LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper [2004]; Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia [2007]). 
We examine the role that auditor remuneration may have on the relation 
between audits and information risk. A line of research starting with DeAngelo 
(1981) suggests that an auditor’s incentive to compromise independence relates 
to how economically significant the client is to the auditor. This research argues 
that an auditor concerned about the possible loss of fee revenue is less likely to 
object to management’s accounting choices because of his economic bond with 
the firm. DeAngelo states that “the existence of client-specific quasi-rents to in- 
cumbent auditors . . . lowers the optimal amount of auditor independence” (1981, 
113). Survey evidence reported by Nelson, Elliott, and Tarpley (2002) and Trom- 
peter (1994) provide support for this argument; the more economically dependent 
the auditor is on the client, the more likely the auditor is to succumb to client 
pressure.’ 
As a test of DeAngelo’s statements, Magee and Tseng (1990) develop a mul- 
tiperiod model and find that the auditor’s value of incumbency presents a threat 
to independence under a set of reasonable circumstances. In particular, because 
many accounting standards require auditor judgment, the potential for differential 
judgments by different auditors gives rise to the possibility that a positive value 
of incumbency could lead an auditor to approve a report that, in the auditor’s 
judgment, may be viewed as an audit failure (Magee and Tseng [1990, 3171). 
Therefore, if high auditor remuneration creates economic bonding and a conse- 
quent lack of independence, investors’ perceptions of reduced credibility will 
increase information risk and ultimately raise the firm’s cost of equity capital. 
As a result, we expect to observe a positive relation between excess auditor 
remuneration and IRR.2 
As a measure of the potential economic bond between the auditor and the 
client, we develop a model of excess auditor remuneration using total fees 
charged by the auditor. One reason for not using the ratio of audit to nonaudit 
1. Prior research yields inconsistent conclusions regarding the association between auditor fees 
and measures of accruals quality. On the one hand, Gul, Chen, and Tsui (2003) and Ahmed, Duell- 
man, and Abdel-Meguid (2006) find a positive association between discretionary accruals and fees. 
In addition, Choi, Kim, and Zang (2005) conclude that auditors’ incentives to compromise audit qual- 
ity differ systematically for more profitable clients (with positive abnormal fees) in relation to less 
profitable clients. On the other hand, Ashbaugh, LaFond, and Mayhew (2003) and Chung and Kalla- 
pur (2003) do not find such a positive relation. These mixed findings provide additional motivation 
for why we focus on investors’ perceptions in this study. 
2. Consistent with our prediction, Mansi, Maxwell, and Miller (2004, 756) argue that “audit qual- 
ity contributes to the credibility of fmancial disclosure, and . . . reduces the cost of [debt] capital.” 
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fees is that nonaudit fee data are not publicly available for most countries. We 
do not expect this choice to have a material impact on our conclusions as Hansen 
and Watts (1997) and Reynolds and Francis (2001) argue that audit and nonaudit 
fees should create similar incentives to the auditor. For example, Reynolds and 
Francis (2001) note that fee dependence is inherent in auditor-client contracting 
and that the strength of the economic bond tends not to depend on whether the 
source of fees is auditing or nonauditing (e.g., con~ulting).~ We discuss a robust- 
ness check to determine whether our inference is sensitive to using different fee 
types (i.e., audit vs. nonaudit) using a sample of U.K. and U.S. firms that have 
detailed auditor remuneration data available. We state our first hypothesis (in al- 
ternative form)[include alternative form in Hl?] as follows: 
H I :  The implied required rate of return on equity capital increases with 
Our next hypothesis examines how the relation between IRR and auditor 
remuneration varies with the degree of investor protection in a firm’s country of 
domicile. This issue relates to a large literature that documents substantial cross- 
country differences in the legal protection of investors’ rights (e.g., La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny [1997, 1998, 20001) and the demand for 
financial accounting information (e.g., Ball, Kothari, and Robin [2000]; Barniv, 
Myring, and Thomas [2005]). In general, the demand for financial accounting in- 
formation increases as the strength of a country’s investor protection increa~es.~ 
One reason for this higher demand, according to Bushman and Smith (2001), is 
that the effectiveness of accounting information in limiting expropriation of minor- 
ity investors is likely to be greater when investors have stronger legal protection? 
In other words, when investor protection is stronger, accounting information can 
play a more prominent role in corporate governance mechanisms. Accordingly, 
research has shown that investor protection is positively associated with the quality 
of financial reporting (e.g., Hung [2000]; Ball, Kothari, and Robin [2000]). 
With respect to the role of auditing, Bushman and Smith (2001) argue that 
the economic benefits of financial accounting disclosures increase with the rigor 
excess auditor remuneration. 
3. Reynolds and Francis (2001) also note that the level of nonaudit fees for audit clients is usu- 
ally rather small and that as of 1999, only 3 percent of clients who purchase consulting services from 
Big 5 auditors have nonaudit (i.e., consulting) fees that exceed audit fees. They argue that these data 
suggest that audit fee dependence on large clients is a far more pervasive threat to auditor independ- 
ence than the incremental effects of consulting fee dependency. 
4. Clatworthy (2005) documents that financial analysts and fund managers in stronger investor 
protection countries perceive the annual report to be more useful than do analysts and fund managers 
in weaker investor protection countries. 
5.  Reese and Weisbach (2002, 66) note the importance of legal regime as follows: “An implicit 
but often unrecognized part of any financial contract is the ability of a legal system to enforce it. 
The quality of legal protection affects the ability of parties to expropriate resources from one another 
ex post, and thus influences the contracts that will be observed ex ante. Differences across countries 
in the quality of protection they provide claimholders should, by this logic, lead to observable differ- 
ences in financial contracting.” 
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with which the reported numbers are audited (see also Hope [2003]). Ball (2001) 
goes one step further and argues that in countries with a weaker legal infrastruc- 
ture, the role of accounting and auditing in contracting is minimal.6 Consistent 
with these arguments, Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2007) find evidence that the 
net payoffs of improved firm-level governance structures are inherently lower in 
countries with weaker legal institutions because the governance structures lack 
credibility. Francis, Khurana, and Pereira (2003) find that higher-quality auditing 
is more likely to exist in countries with stronger investor pr~tection.~ Further- 
more, Francis et al. (2006) show that the demand for auditing is greater in coun- 
tries with stronger legal systems. This occurs because the credibility of an audit, 
as a governance mechanism, requires supporting country-level institutions.* 
When those country-level institutions are stronger, investors tend to rely more on 
an audit to assess the quality of financial statement information. When those 
country-level institutions are weaker, investors rely on alternative sources of in- 
formation (e.g., Ball [2001]), and variation in the quality of the audit is less rele- 
vant to their decisions.’ 
To summarize, when investor protection is stronger, investors rely to a 
greater extent on financial accounting information. The greater reliance on 
accounting information causes investors’ decisions to be more sensitive to 
changes in the perceived credibility of audited financial statements. If investors 
view higher auditor remuneration as creating economic bonding between the 
auditor and the client (thus increasing information risk), investors are more likely 
to respond by requiring a higher cost of equity capital in stronger investor pro- 
tection countries. In contrast, when investors are less likely to rely on audited fi- 
nancial statements (i.e., in countries with weaker investor protection), the impact 
of auditor-client bonding is naturally less important to investors’ decisions. In 
these countries, investors rely more heavily on other sources of information, and 
variation in the credibility of audited financial statements is less meaningful. This 
suggests a reduced relation between excess auditor remuneration and IRR in 
weaker investor protection countries. Our second hypothesis (in alternative form) 
[does not appear to be stated in alternative form] follows: 
6. In theory, it is conceivable that the opposite may hold. That is, country-level institutions and 
firm-level governance mechanisms such as auditing could be substitutes. However, as detailed in this 
section, empirical research supports the notion that these factors primarily are complements rather 
than substitutes. 
7. Francis et al. (2003) also find that higher-quality accounting and auditing are positively asso- 
ciated with financial market development, but only in countries whose legal systems are conducive to 
the protection of investors. 
8. Consistent with these arguments, Fan and Wong (2005) find that the payoffs to adopting 
independent audits in East Asia are limited. They argue that the opaque business environment in 
these countries limits the effectiveness of the audit function and that the external audit loses its 
value when an auditor’s adverse opinion does not result in significant consequences (given weaker 
legal enforcement). 
9. Choi, Kang, Kwon, and Zang (2005) show that audit quality has less of an influence on ana- 
lysts’ earnings forecasts accuracy in weaker investor protection environments. 
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H2: The positive association between the implied required rate of return on 
equity capital and excess auditor remuneration increases with the strength 
of country-level investor protection. 
3. Research Design 
To test our hypotheses, we estimate the following regression (firm and time 
subscripts omitted): 
IRR = Po + PIExcessFee + P2Big4 + $$ndSpec + $&vPro + $&IFAR 
+ P61nSize + $+BM + P9Betu + P9Mom + PloIdRisk + PllDisp 
+ P12RFRate + Year and Industry Indicators + E (1) 
where the variables are defined as follows: 
Implied Required Rate of Return (IRR): Since expected (or ex ante) cost of 
equity capital is not directly observable, recent studies rely on observable meas- 
ures of IRR to examine its determinants (e.g., Khurana and Raman [2004]; Hail 
and Leuz [2006]).'0 We estimate IRR using four models: two implementations of 
the Ohlson (1995) residual income valuation model (hereafter R N  model), the 
Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) model (hereafter OJ model), and the PEG 
model (a specific form of the OJ model). For all four models, the idea is to sub- 
stitute price and analysts' earnings forecasts into a valuation equation and to 
back out IRR as the internal rate of return that equates current stock price and 
the expected future sequence of residual incomes or abnormal earnings (Hail and 
Leuz [2006]). Because it is not clear which implementation of the valuation 
model is superior in terms of deriving at a more reliable IRR, and to reduce mea- 
surement error in the estimates, we use the average of the four ZRR measures 
(e.g., Boone, Khurana, and Raman [2005]; Hail and Leuz [2006])." Appendix A 
provides a detailed discussion of the measurement of IRR for each model. 
Excess Auditor Remuneration (ExcessFee): Our approach to computing 
excess auditor remuneration follows extant research (e.g., Frankel, Johnson, and 
Nelson [2002]; Choi, Kim, and Zang [2005]; Hope and Langli [2008]). That is, 
we regress total auditor fees (TotFee) on a large number of explanatory variables 
and use the residuals from this regression as our proxy for excess fees.'* The ex- 
planatory variables control for normal fees charged by the auditor for a given 
10. Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001) and Botosan and Plumlee (2005) point out that 
tests of the relevance of information for asset valuation require measures of ex ante rather than ex 
post returns (see also Fama and French [1997]; Vuolteenaho [2002]). 
1 1 .  As an alternative, we use the first principal component of the four individual IRR estimates 
and find results that are consistent with (and stronger than) those reported. 
12. To be specific, for auditor fees, we use the natural log of total auditor remuneration. As 
described above, this measure includes fees for both audit and nonaudit services. We obtain consist- 
ent results when we scale total auditor remuneration by lagged total assets. 
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level of effort and risk. We are interested in identifying abnormal fees related to 
economic rent (i.e., threat to independence). 
For the explanatory variables, we include two auditor variables-auditor size 
(Big4) and auditor industry specialization (IndSpec)-and eleven firm varia- 
bles-log of market value of equity (InSize), log of book-to-market ratio (InBM), 
log of sales revenues ( M a l e s ) ,  leverage (Lev), return on equity (ROE), indicator 
variables for long-term capital issuance (either debt or equity, Cuplssue), for 
non-zero foreign operations (ForOps), for discontinued operations (DiscOps), for 
acquisitions (Acq), a variable measuring intangible asset intensity defined as in- 
tangible assets scaled by total assets (Intangible), and the sum of inventories and 
accounts receivable scaled by total assets ( I n ~ R e c ) . ' ~  
We estimate ExcessFee separately for stronger and weaker investor protec- 
tion c~untr ies . '~  As an additional control for country-level factors, we include a 
country-level variable that proxies for the extent of litigation auditors face in a 
particular economy, the Wingate index (see Choi and Wong [2007]).15 Finally, 
we control for both time period (year) and industry affiliation (two-digit Standard 
Industry Codes [SICS]) through indicator variables. We estimate eq. (2) and use 
the error term (u) as our measure of ExcessFee. 
TotFee = yo + ylBig4 + y21ndSpec + y31nSize + y41nBM + y51nSales + y 6 k v  
+ y7ROE + y&apIssue + y9ForOps + yloDiscOps + yllAcq 
+ yllIntangible + y131nvRec + y14 Wingate 
+ Year and Industry Indicators + II (2) 
Hypothesis 1 would be supported if the coefficient on ExcessFee ( P I )  in eq. 
(1) is positive and significant. To test Hypothesis 2, we split the sample into 
stronger and weaker investor protection groups and test whether the coefficient 
on ExcessFee is more positive in stronger investor protection countries than in 
weaker investor protection countries. 
The remaining variables in eq. (1) control for other factors potentially 
related to IRR. We are interested in the relation between ExcessFee and IRR, 
beyond any other factors identified in previous research. For this purpose, we 
control for auditor type, auditor industry specialization, investor protection, and 
disclosure levels. We include an extensive list of other control variables to miti- 
gate the concern that our findings, if any, are merely driven by omitted risk 
13. We use the natural logarithm of market value of equity, book-to-market ratio, and sales rev- 
enues. Using logs of all firm-level variables or not using logs for any variables has no effect on our 
inferences. All variables used in the study, except for ratios and indicator variables, are translated 
into Special Drawing Rights. We also consider the effect of client size nonlinearities by adding inter- 
action terms with client size (InSize) to our ExcessFee model. There is no noticeable change in the 
adjusted RZ of the ExcessFee model with this specification, and no inferences are affected. 
14. Results are similar and no inferences affected when we instead estimate ExcessFee using a 
pooled model. 
15. As an alternative to the Wingate index, we have used InvPro or country fixed effects and 
find results similar to those reported. 
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proxies. To establish a link between cost of equity capital and a variable of inter- 
est (e.g., excess auditor remuneration), it is imperative to control for known risk 
factors. Specifically, we include six (nonauditing) firm-level control variables 
and one country-level variable: firm size, book-to-market ratio, market beta, 
price momentum, idiosyncratic risk, analysts’ earnings forecast dispersion, and 
risk-free interest rate (a country-level variable that varies by year). In addition, 
we control for year and industry effects. 
Auditor Type (Big4): To control for the insurance risk effect of auditing 
(Khurana and Raman [2004]), we include auditor type (Big 4 versus non-Big 4) 
in our tests.I6 Given their “deep pockets,” Big 4 auditors offer more insurance 
for the client (e.g., Palmrose [1988]; Dye [1993]).” Prior literature further sug- 
gests that large auditors tend to provide higher-quality audits to reduce litigation 
risk and to protect their brand-name reputation (e.g., Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, 
and Subramanyam [1998]). Big4 equals one if the auditor is a Big 4 audit firm, 
and zero otherwise.18 
Auditor Industry Specialization (ZndSpec): DeAngelo (198 1) notes that the 
ability of an auditor to detect material error in the financial statements is a func- 
tion of auditor competence, and auditors that specialize in an industry are likely 
to be more competent. To the extent that investors’ expectations about any mate- 
rial omissions or misstatements decline as the auditor specializes in a particular 
industry, their perceived level of information risk will decrease. This suggests 
that investors’ perceived level of information risk might be lower when the audi- 
tor specializes in the industry the client firm operates in, ceteris paribus. ZndSpec 
is measured as the number of clients in that auditor-country-industry-year combi- 
nation divided by total number of clients of that auditor in that country-year 
combination. l 9  
Investor Protection (ZnvPro): We use the Legal Enforcement variable from 
La Porta et al. (1998) to proxy for the level of investor protection in a country. 
It is measured as the mean score across three legal variables: (1) the efficiency 
of the judicial system, (2) an assessment of the rule of law, and (3) the cormp- 
tion index. All three variables range from zero to ten. This proxy for investor 
protection has been used in several recent studies (e.g., Leuz, Nanda, and 
Wysocki [2003]; DeFond, Hung, and Trezevant [2007]; Ding, Hope, Jeanjean, 
and Stolowy [2007]). For example, Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) find that 
16. Khurana and Raman (2004) find that U.S. firms audited by Big 4 auditors have lower IRR 
than those not audited by the Big 4, but they do not find this association in other developed common 
law countries (i.e., Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom). They interpret their results to imply 
that Big 4 auditors provide high-quality audits mainly to avoid costly lawsuits. 
17. The insurance effect refers to the investor’s ability to recover from auditors the losses 
sustained by relying on audited financial statements that contain misrepresentations (Menon and 
Williams [1994]). 
18. We use Big4 to refer to both the current four largest audit firms as well as their predeces- 
sors during our sample period (i.e., the Big 6). 
19. We use the membership within the broadest industry category (“Sector”) among the three 
levels of I/B/E/S industry classifications. 
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earnings management (measured at the country level) is decreasing in investor 
protection. Holding other factors constant, we expect a negative association 
between InvPro and IRR. 
Corporate Disclosure (CIFAR): Hail and Leuz (2006) find that corporate dis- 
closures reduce cost of equity capital across countries by reducing information 
asymmetry among stakeholders and hence the equity risk premium demanded by 
investors. To control for this factor, we include country-level CIFAR index 
scores (CIFAR [ 1995]), which capture both voluntary and mandatory disclosure 
levels.20 We expect a negative coefficient on CIFAR. 
Firm Size (Insize): Penman (2004) discusses the importance of liquidity in 
explaining the cost of equity capital, and Amihud and Mendelson (1986) argue 
that firm size proxies for liquidity. Firm size is further identified as a risk proxy 
by Fama and French (1995). We therefore use the natural log of market value of 
equity as the risk proxy for liquidity and expect a negative association between 
IRR and market value of equity. 
Book-to-Market Ratio (1nBM): Fama and French (1993) suggest that fnBM 
may proxy for a “distress factor,” because financially distressed firms are likely 
to have high InBM. Fama and French (1992) and Lakonishok, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1994) document a positive association between lnBM and realized stock 
returns. lnBM also captures differences in accounting rules between regimes 
(Joos and Lang [1994]; Hail and Leuz [2006]). Following Gebhardt, Lee, and 
Swaminathan (2001), Gode and Mohanram (2003), and Hail and Leuz (2006), 
we thus consider the natural log of book-to-market ratio as one of our risk prox- 
ies, and we predict a positive association with IRR.21 
Market Beta (Beta): The Capital Asset Pricing Model predicts a positive 
association between a firm’s beta and its cost of equity capital, and consequently 
we include Beta to control for systematic risk (and expect its coefficient to be 
positive). We estimate Beta by regressing monthly stock returns against the 
world stock market index in the sixty months preceding the current period.22 We 
use the MSCI (Morgan Stanley Capital International) World Index as the meas- 
ure of the stock market performance around the 
Stock Price Momentum (Mom): Because our IRR estimates rely on analysts’ 
earnings forecasts, which are known to be sluggish in incorporating information 
20. The CIFAR (1995) index is based on the inclusion/exclusion of eighty-five financial state- 
ment items, divided into the following seven categories: ( 1 )  general information, (2) income state- 
ment, (3) balance sheet, (4) funds flow statement, ( 5 )  accounting policies, (6) stockholders’ 
information, and (7) supplementary information. Within each group, CFAR computes the percentage 
of availability of the variable in the annual report of the company. See Hope. (2003) for extensive va- 
lidity tests of the CIFAR scores. For our study, we use the average total CIFAR score per country. 
21. No inferences are affected if we include the growth rate estimated using analysts’ one- and 
two-year ahead earnings forecasts as an additional control variable for growth. 
22. To estimate Beta, we require at least twenty-four monthly observations be available. 
23. Using the MSCI World Index assumes that the capital markets in our sample countries are 
integrated, which may not be the case. No inferences are affected by excluding Beta as a control 
variable. In addition, as discussed below, we also control for idiosyncratic risk in our regressions. 
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contained in stock prices, we control for stock price momentum (Guay, Kothari, 
and Shu [2005]). Guay, Kothari, and Shu (2005) suggest that if analysts are 
delayed in incorporating good (bad) news contained in recent stock returns, the 
IRR estimates are systematically biased downward (upward). This leads us to 
predict a negative coefficient on Mom, which is the stock return over the previ- 
ous twelve months. 
Idiosyncratic Risk (IdRisk): While Beta measures systematic risk, Lehmann 
( 1  990) and Malkiel and Xu (1997), among others, present evidence on the impor- 
tance of idiosyncratic risk (IdRisk). Therefore, we include IdRisk as a potential 
risk factor in our tests. Our measure of IdRisk is the variance of residuals from 
the market model regressions (Lehman 1990). If idiosyncratic risk is priced, we 
expect a positive coefficient on IdRisk. 
Forecast Dispersion (Disp): Following Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan 
(2001) and Botosan and Plumlee (2005), we consider the dispersion in analysts’ 
earnings forecasts as a potential risk proxy and expect Disp to be positively 
related to IRR. We measure the dispersion of forecasts as the standard deviation 
of the one-year-ahead earnings forecasts scaled by the absolute mean of these 
forecasts as of September of each year. We obtain the mean forecast from the 
Institutional Brokerage Estimate System (I/B/E/S) Summary File. 
Risk-Free Interest Rate (RFRate): IRR can vary across countries because of 
differences in the risk-free interest rate. We control for this by including the 
Treasury Bill rates or government bond yields from Global Insight and Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) International Financial Statistics as a proxy for the 
risk-free interest rate. We expect a positive association between RFRate and IRR. 
Finally, we include indicator variables for time period (year) and industry 
affiliation (two-digit SIC codes) in all models. Fama and French (1997) show 
that firms’ cost of equity capital can vary systematically across industries. We 
include year indicators to account for possible year-to-year variations in the IRR. 
Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
Our empirical analysis is based on a sample of firms from fourteen countries 
from 1995 to 2003. We extract accounting data from Cornpustat North America 
(U.S. firms) and Compustat Global (non-U.S. firms); stock price, analysts’ eam- 
ings forecasts, and industry identification code from I/B/E/S (all firms); and 
stock returns from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) (U.S. firms). 
We use the exchange rate data from IMF International Financial Statistics. In 
September of each year,24 we select firm-years that satisfy the following criteria: 
( 1 )  nonfinancial firm; (2) financial statement data available from Cornpustat; 
( 3 )  stock price, consensus one-year-ahead and two-year-ahead analysts’ earnings 
forecasts, industry identification code, and number of shares data available from 
24. This criterion follows Frankel and Lee (1999). 
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I/B/E/S; (4) consistency of currency codes between Cornpustat Global and I/B/E/ 
S, and between adjacent years; ( 5 )  stock return data available from CRSP or cal- 
culated from Cornpustat (6) all of the risk proxies available; (7) book 
value of equity is positive; (8) positive values for the means of one-year-ahead 
and two-year-ahead analysts’ earnings forecasts;2h (9) country-level variables 
available; and (10) necessary auditor data available from Cornpustat North Amer- 
ica for U.S. firms and Cornpustat Global for non-U.S. firms.27 This process 
yields a final sample of 9,008 firm-year observations (3,273 distinct firms) from 
fourteen countries.28 
Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1. Panel A shows that IRR has a 
mean and median of 0.1 10 and 0.102, respectively.2’*”) The mean and median of 
ExcessFee are 0.000 (by construction) and -0.007, respectively. Big4 has a mean 
of 0.894, indicating that 89.4 percent of our sample firms have a Big 4 auditor. 
ZndSpec has a mean value of 0.214, meaning that the auditors in our sample are 
engaged in approximately five industries on average in a country. 
Panel B of Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for InvPro and the number 
of observations per country. We classify Australia, Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States as 
stronger investor protection countries. We classify Hong Kong (China), India, 
Malaysia, Singapore, South Africa, and Spain as weaker investor protection 
countries. While the distinction between stronger and weaker investor protection 
is a continuum, we determine a cutoff that leaves adequate sample size for the 
weaker investor protection group.3’ Many of the countries with the weakest in- 
vestor protection scores as reported in La Porta et al. (1998) do not require 
25. We calculate sum-dividend stock returns for non-U.S. firms from the data of stock prices 
and dividends extracted from Cornpusrut Global. 
26. As noted by Gode and Mohanram (2003), empirical implementation of the 0.1 model (and 
thus also the PEG model) requires this condition. 
27. Unfortunately, data on auditor remuneration are not widely available in commercial data- 
bases. Auditor remuneration data are available for U.S. publicly traded companies in Compustut from 
2001. As one of our sensitivity analyses, we report results for a subsample of U.K. and U.S. firms 
that have both audit and nonaudit fee data available. 
28. We adjust all per share numbers for stock splits and stock dividends using I/B/E/S adjust- 
ment factors. Also, when I/s/E/S indicates that the consensus forecast for that firn-year is on a ful ly  
diluted basis, we use I/B/E/S dilution factors to convert those numbers to a primary basis. Further- 
more, to mitigate the effects of outliers, we winsorize IndSpec, InSizc,, InBM, Betu, M o m ,  IiIRisk, 
InSules, Lev, ROE, Intangible, and InvRec at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles and D~.s/J at the 
ninety-ninth percentile of the pooled distribution. Other variables are categorical in nature and do not 
exhibit extreme observations. 
29. For illustrative purposes, the mean IRR is highest in South Africa (0.156) and India (0.140), 
and lowest in the Netherlands (0.096). The United States has an IRR of 0.103. 
30. Unreported statistics show that the IRR estimates from the four models are quite close to 
each other. Specifically, the means of IRR from the RIVC, RIVI, OJ, and PEG model are 0.082. 
0.117, 0.127, and 0.113, respectively, which is close to that reported in previous research (e.g., Chen, 
Jorgensen, and Yo0 [2004]). In addition, all four estimates are positively and significantly correlated 
with each other (Pearson correlations between 0.47 and 0.96). 
31. If we restrict the sample to countries that have at least 100 observations (leaving ten coun- 
tries) and classify the top (bottom) five countries as stronger (weaker) investor protection, results are 
very similar to those reported. 
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public disclosure of auditor remuneration and therefore do not make our sample. 
This works against us finding support for Hypothesis 2.  
As is common when using samples from different countries, sample sizes 
vary greatly across countries (Table 1, Panel B). We deal with this issue in the 
following ways. First, our focus is not on each country per se, but rather auditor 
remuneration and the level of investor protection in a given country. Thus we 
pool observations from different countries into stronger and weaker investor pro- 
tection groups for our tests of Hypothesis 2. Second, in addition to ordinary least 
squares (OLS), we report results using country-weighted least squares (WLS), 
where the weight is inversely proportional to the number of observations per 
country. Using WLS ensures that uneven country representation in our sample 
will not bias our results toward countries that are more heavily represented. 
Third, we report results of alternative sample choices in which we require a min- 
imum number of observations per country. Finally, given that the United States 
accounts for such a large portion (43 %) of the sample, we repeat tests excluding 
U.S. observations. 
A Pearson correlation matrix of the regression variables is shown in Table 2.  
IRR is significantly positively correlated with ExcessFee. This finding provides 
univariate support for Hypothesis 1. IRR is negatively correlated with B i g l ,  
I n v P w ,  CIFAR,  InSize, and Mom and is positively correlated with InBM, IdRisk, 
Disp, and RFRute.  These correlations are in the predicted direction. IRR is posi- 
tively correlated with IndSpe and is not significantly correlated with Beta. B y  
construction, E-wessFee is uncorrelated with the variables included in the Excess- 
Fee model in eq. (2). Correlation results should be interpreted cautiously as they 
do not control for differences in firm characteristics over time or in the cross 
section. Consequently, we now turn to multivariate test results. 
5. Results 
In this section, we first provide results of “validity tests” of our IRR meas- 
ure. Then we discuss our model to compute ExcessFee before presenting results 
of our hypotheses tests. Finally, we subject our results to a battery of sensitivity 
analyses. Reported significance levels are two-sided and based on Newey-West 
standard errors that correct for both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
(Newey and West [ 19871). 
5.1 ZRR Estimates and Risk Proxies 
The purpose of this section is to validate the IRR measure by showing that it 
relates to proxies capturing various sources of risk. As in Botosan (1997), Boto- 
san and Plumlee (2005), and Hail and Leuz (2006), we regress IRR on risk prox- 
ies that have been used in prior literature. Results are presented in Table 3. With 
the exception of Beta, which is not significant, all variables are highly significant 
and have signs that are consistent with theory or prior research. Overall, the 
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TABLE 3 
Regression of IRR on Risk Proxies 



















Note: This table presents the results of an OLS regression of IRR on risk proxies for the pooled sample. 
The repression equation is as follows: 
IRR = Po + p,fnSize + P21nEM + P3Eeru + PIMorn + P,ldRisk + 
+ p,Disp + P,RFRnte + Year and Industry Indicators + E 
Please see notes to Table I for explanations of variables. Year and industry indicators are included 
but not reported. The t-statistics are based on Newey-West standard errors (Newey and West [1987]). 
* I * .  
indicates significance at the I percent level (two-tailed). 
model explains 44 percent of the variation in IRR for our sample of firms. These 
regression results suggest that our estimate of IRR relates to risk proxies in a pre- 
dictable manner, which provides reasonable assurance that our measure of IRR is 
a reliable proxy for the unobservable ex ante cost of equity capital.32 
5.2 Estimation of Excess Fees 
In estimating excess auditor fees, it is important that our model does not omit 
variables related to normal fees charged by the auditor for the level of work or risk 
of the client. While one may consider the possibility that auditors bond with their 
clients based on normal fees, we do not consider that issue in our paper. We are 
interested in fees that cannot be explained by normal factors related to the level of 
audit effort and risk. To do this, we carefully consider a number of factors that 
likely relate to normal auditor fees (see previous discussion of eq. (2)). Table 4 
32. Frankel and Lee (1999) and Chen, Jorgensen, and Yo0 (2004) find that equity value esti- 
mates derived from models similar to ours are reliable in their international samples (of twenty and 
seven countries. respectively). Untabulated results show that the adjusted R2 of our IRR model is 43 
percent and 50 percent in stronger and weaker investor protection countries, respectively, and all sig- 
nificant relations hold in both subsarnples. 
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TABLE 4 
Estimation of Excess Auditor Remuneration (ExcessFee) 
































































Note: This table presents the results of the pooled OLS regression for the following equation: 
TotFee = yo + y,Big4 + y,IndSpec + y31nSize + y,lnBM + yslnSales + yhLev t y7ROE 
+ y&aplssue i ylForOps t yloDiscOps + y I  ,Acq + yl2lntangihle 
+ yI3lnvRec + yl4Wingare + Year and Industry Indicators + u 
We compute ExcessFee (used in subsequent tables of hypotheses testing) as the residuals from this 
model. The estimation is done separately for stronger and weaker investor protection countries. Please 
see notes to Table 1 for explanations of variables except the following. TotFre is the natural log of 
total auditor remuneration translated into Special Drawing Rights. 1nSulr.s is the natural logarithm of 
sales revenues, adjusted by the exchange rate of the local currency to Special Drawing Rights. Lei, is 
long-term debt scaled by total assets, and ROE is the return on equity. Cuplssrre, For.O/~s, II~.sc~O/J.S. 
and Acq are indicator variables for long-term capital issuance (either debt or equity), for non-zero for- 
eign operations (measured as non-zero foreign income tax expense), for discontinued operations, and 
for acquisitions, respectively. Intangible is intangible assets scaled by total assets. Ini~Rrc is the sum 
of inventories and accounts receivable scaled by total assets. Wingatr is a country-level variable that 
proxies for the extent of litigation auditors face in a country. Year and industry indicators are 
included but not reported. The t-statistics are based on Newey and West (1987) standard errors. 
*** , 
indicates significance at the 1 percent level (two-tailed). 
shows the results of our ExcessFee model. The model, which includes fourteen ex- 
planatory variables plus industry and year fixed effects, has high explanatory 
power, with an adjusted R2 of 72 percent.’3 The high R2 increases our confidence 
33. For brevity we show only the results for the full sample. As explained above, we estimate 
the model separately for stronger and weaker investor protection groups. Unreported results show that 
the model behaves similarly in the two groups and achieves similar explanatory power (with adjusted 
R2s of 0.74 and 0.75 for stronger and weaker investor protection countries, respectively). 
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that we are appropriately controlling for a large amount of the normal fees. If we 
had obtained a low R’, then our model would be more likely to suffer from omit- 
ted variables, as a large portion of auditor remuneration should be normal. We are 
comforted by the fact that auditor remuneration relates to the fee determinant vari- 
ables in the expected direction. As predicted, auditor remuneration is significantly 
and positively associated with Big4, IndSpec, InSize, lnBM, Insales, Lev, Caplssue, 
For-Ops, DiscOps, Intangible, InvRec, and Wingate, and is negatively related to 
ROE. As explained above, our model controls for year and industry fixed effects 
(not shown in Table 4).34 
We can never rule out the possibility that our ExcessFee measure contains a 
normal component, but the high explanatory power of the model provides rea- 
sonable evidence that we appropriately capture excess fees. In addition, we report 
several other sensitivity tests on this issue later in the paper. These tests further 
increase our confidence that our model is well specified and that its conclusions 
are reliable. 
5.3 Results of Hypotheses Tests 
5.3.1 Tests of Hypothesis I 
We first examine whether excess auditor remuneration can explain differen- 
ces in IRR, after controlling for risk proxies previously introduced into the model 
and controlling for other audit properties and country-level investor protection 
and disclosure scores. As discussed, we are interested in testing whether excess 
fees reduce investors’ perceptions of auditor independence, leading to diminished 
credibility of financial information and increased information risk. 
Results for the full sample of firms are presented in Table 5. We present 
four sets of results: ( 1 )  OLS excluding CIFAR, ( 2 )  OLS including CIFAR, ( 3 )  
WLS excluding CIFAR, and (4) WLS including CIFAR. The potential advantage 
of using WLS versus OLS is discussed earlier and relates to differences in sam- 
ple sizes across countries. The motivation for including and exluding CZFAR 
scores relates to their potential lack of relevance to our sample period. These 
scores are generated based on disclosures in the early 1990s, and disclosure prac- 
tices may have changed between then and our sample period. 
The first column shows results of OLS regressions that exclude CZFAR. The 
risk proxies continue to be significant in the predicted direction (with the excep- 
tion of Beta). IndSpec is significantly negatively associated with IRR, suggesting 
34. One would expect the cross-sectional variation of normal fees to be greater than the cross- 
sectional variation in excess fees. Consistent with this expectation, we find that the difference 
between the third and first quartile for normal fees is more than twice as large as it is for ExcessFee. 
We would also expect excess fees to be relatively constant across years for a given firm. For firms 
that have multiple observations, we determine the extent to which the sign of their ExceeFee remains 
the same in the following year. We find that 82 percent of firms keep the same sign of excess fees 
from one year to the next. These results give us additional confidence that ExcessFee captures remu- 
neration other than normal fees related to effort and risk. 
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that auditors with industry expertise (and thus higher competence) may be better 
at reducing information risk than other auditors. Big4 is not significantly related 
to IRR. Int,PI-o is negative and significant. Our focus, however, is on ExcessFee, 
which is positive and significant at the 1 percent level. This result is consistent 
with Hypothesis 1 and the univariate finding. The finding supports the notion 
that the stronger the potential economic bond between the audit firm and its cli- 
ent, the greater the risk perceived by investors and hence the higher the required 
rate of return on equity capital. 
The second column repeats the analysis after adding the control for country- 
level disclosure, CIFAR. CIFAR is significantly negatively related to IRR, con- 
sistent with greater disclosure reducing the cost of capital. More important, 
E.~c~cs.sFce continues to be significantly positively associated with IRR. The thrid 
and fourth columns (with and without CIFAR, respectively) show that excess 
remuneration is even more strongly positively associated with IRR when using 
WLS. 
The conclusion from these regression results is that excess auditor remunera- 
tion, which proxies for the extent of economic bonding (and hence reduced audi- 
tor independence), is significantly positively associated with our ex ante proxy 
for the cost of equity capital, IRR. These results support Hypothesis 1. 
5.3.2 Tests of Hypothesis 2 
We next split the sample based on investor protection and test whether 
EscessFee has a differential relation with IRR in stronger versus weaker investor 
protection countries. The regression results for each subsample are reported in 
Table 6. We later report sensitivity analyses regarding both our proxy for inves- 
tor protection and our classification of firms into stronger and weaker countries. 
Panel A of Table 6 shows that for all four regression specifications for the 
stronger investor protection group (OLS and WLS, excluding and including 
CIFAR), E.~ccssFce is positively and significantly related to IRR. Conversely, 
Panel B shows that in all four models for the weaker investor protection group, 
the coefficient on EsccssFee is small and not significant. Furthermore, for all 
four tests, the coefficient on ExcessFee is significantly larger for the stronger inves- 
tor protection group than for the weaker investor protection group, with t-statistics 
between 2.46 and 3.75.’s,3h 
35. In the reported results, we split the sample based on stronger versus weaker investor protec- 
tion. As a sensitivity analysis, we add Invfro to the regressions and let Invfro vary within each 
group. Results are consistent with those reported in Table 6.  
36. To further ensure that our results are not affected by the fact that significantly more obser- 
vations are included in the stronger than in the weaker investor protection group, we randomly select 
the same number of observations from the stronger investor protection group as we have observations 
for the weaker investor protection group ( i t . ,  N = 1,716) and repeat the tests. Results are very simi- 
lar to those reported and suggest that sample size differences do not explain our tabulated results. 
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The results reported in this section support Hypothesis 2 and suggest that 
investors view economic bonding as more serious in high investor protection 
countries than in low investor protection countries. Our findings are consistent 
with the arguments in Bushman and Smith (2001), Ball (2001), Francis, Khurana, 
and Pereira (2003), and Francis et al. (2006) that auditing plays a lesser role in 
environments that lack the “enabling” country-level institutions. In other words, 
it is primarily in environments in which those country-level institutions are stron- 
ger that investors tend to rely on an audit to assess the quality of financial state- 
ment information. Thus, the negative effect of bonding between the auditor and 
client firm is perceived as relatively more detrimental in stronger investor protec- 
tion countries. 
In addition to providing support for our second hypothesis, the results 
reported above can be interpreted as lending additional support to our findings 
for Hypothesis 1. That is, although our excess fee model includes a large number 
of variables and exhibits high explanatory power, it is always possible that our 
model does not fully control for normal fees. In this case, the positive relation 
between ExcessFee and IRR may relate to IRR representing an additional 
“work” variable. Firms with higher IRR are riskier and therefore normally 
require more audit effort, and more audit effort leads to higher fees. While this 
reasoning still leads to a positive relation between E.wcessFer and IRR as pre- 
dicted by Hypothesis 1, causality is in the opposite direction to that discussed. If 
our finding for ExcessFee reflects issues related to effort and risk for which we 
do not fully control in the ExcessFee model, the same should hold in both stron- 
ger and weaker investor protection countries. The fact that we observe a signifi- 
cantly stronger relation in countries in which we predict a stronger relation 
increases our confidence in the results and conclusions. 
5.4 Robustness Tests 
Although we report several specifications of our models above, in this sec- 
tion, we subject our findings to a number of further robustness and specification 
checks. In particular, we report on sensitivity analyses related to our test vari- 
able (ExcessFee),  our partitioning variable (InvPro), and several other robust- 
ness tests.37 
5.4.1 Auditor Remuneration 
Given the importance of ExcessFee in our tests, we discuss results of five 
different sensitivity analyses related to auditor remuneration. 
5.4.1.1 Audit versus nonaudit fees. Table 7 reports the results for a sample 
of 533 U.K. and 1.562 U.S. observations that have available data for both audit 
37. For brevity, we tabulate only the results of the first sensitivity analysis. Other robustness 
results are available from the authors upon request. 
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and nonaudit fees ( N  = 2,095).’8 The results show that whereas both excess 
audit fees and excess nonaudit fees are positively associated with IRR, only 
excess audit fees are significant at conventional levels. These results provide sup- 
port for using total remuneration in our analyses. 
TABLE 7 
Tests of the Relation between Implied Required Rate of Return (ZRR) 
and Excess Audit and Excess Nonaudit Remuneration for Subsample of 
U.K. and U.S. Firms 
Excess Audit Fee Model Excess Nonaudit Fee Model 

















































Note: This table presents results of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for a subsample of U.K. 
and U S .  firms that have data available regarding the breakdown of total auditor remuneration into both 
audit and nonaudit fees in FAME and Cornpusfat, respectively. 
IRR = Po + PlExcessAuditFee (PIExcessNonAudifFee) + PzBig4 + PjZndSpec + P4lnSize 
+ PslnBM + p&efa + p&forn + PJdRisk + P@isp + p & F R a f e  
+ Year and Industry Indicators + E 
Please see notes to Table I for explanations of variables other than ExcessAuditFee and ExcessNo- 
nArrdirFec. Exc.es.sAudirFee (E~-~essNonAuditFee) is the excess audit fees (nonaudit fees) computed 
as the residuals from eq. (2), in which audit fees (nonaudit fees) are used as a dependent variable. 
Year and industry indicators are included in all regressions. The f-statistics are based on Newey and 
West (19x7) standard errors. 
, and * indicate significance at the I ,  5, and 10 percent level, respectively (two-tailed). 
*** * I  
, 
38.  The U . K .  data are from the FAME database, and we thank Mark Clatworthy for providing 
the\e data. The U S .  data are from Cornpusfat. For simplicity, we use the same explanatory variables 
(1.e.. eq. ( 2 ) )  for both excess audit and excess nonaudit fees. 
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5.4.1.2 Potential simultaneity between IRR and auditor remuneration. We 
have implicitly assumed that auditor remuneration is not affected by the firm’s 
cost of equity capital. This may not be the case and we deal with the issue that 
IRR and auditor remuneration may be simultaneously determined by estimating a 
two-stage least squares (2SLS) model. In the first stage, we regress total auditor 
remuneration on all the variables previously included in eq. (2) as well as IRR. 
Untabulated results show that IRR does not load significantly as an explanatory 
variable for auditor remuneration. More important, controlling for this potential 
simultaneity does not alter the result in the second-stage equation: auditor remu- 
neration is positively associated with IRR at the 1 percent level. This result sug- 
gests that our finding is not confounded by possible simultaneity between IRR 
and excess auditor remuneration. 
5.4.1.3 Separate estimations with positive and negative ExcessFee. If 
ExcessFee appropriately captures economic rents associated with perceived lack 
of independence, then we are more likely to observe a positive relation between 
ExcessFee and IRR when ExcessFee is positive. Bonding is less likely to occur 
for any level of negative ExcessFee. Therefore, a relation between E.~-cc~.s.sFee 
and IRR is expected when ExcessFee is negative. If ExcessFee captures addi- 
tional work required for riskier clients, then the positive relation between Excws- 
Fee and IRR should hold whether ExcessFee is positive or negative. Under this 
scenario, negative ExcessFee would simply suggest lower fees charged for a less 
risky client. The more negative ExcessFee, the less risky the firm and the less 
work required of the auditor.” 
We reestimate eq. ( I )  separately for positive and negative values of Ekess -  
Fee. For the subsample with positive values of ExcessFee, we find a positive 
and significant (at the 1 percent level) coefficient on Exc.essFcc. In contrast, for 
the subsample with negative values of ExcessFee, we find a negative and insig- 
nificant coefficient on ExcessFee. Finding a significant relation only for the posi- 
tive ExcessFee subsample supports our main conclusions that excess auditor 
remuneration influences IRR.40 An economic bond between the auditor and the 
client is more likely to occur when excess auditor remuneration is positive. As 
the extent of positive excess remuneration increases, so too does the strength of 
the auditor-client bonding. Because negative excess fees are not expected to cre- 
ate auditor-client bonding, IRR should not vary with the extent of negative 
39. As an example of this test in prior research, see Choi, Kim, and Zang (2005). They find 
that audit quality (measured as unsigned discretionary accruals) is negatively associated with abnor- 
mal audit fees for the subsample of clients with positive abnormal fees. For the subsample of clients 
with negative abnormal fees, no association is found. 
40. As an alternative test, we have ranked observations into quintiles based o n  the magnitude 
of ExcessFee. We then omit the middle quintile (as it is hard to argue that very small positive excess 
fees give rise to different incentives than very small negative excess fees), and compare the top and 
bottom two quintiles. We find similar results as those reported in the text. 
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excess remuneration. ExcessFee does not appear to be capturing additional audit 
work related to IRR. 
5.4.1.4 Potential eflects of the Sarhanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Sarbanes- 
Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) came into effect in 2002 and may have affected audi- 
tor fees, especially in the United States (and possibly elsewhere). Consistent with 
that possibility, untabulated statistics show that mean auditor fees are signifi- 
cantly higher in the post-SOX period (2002-2003) than in the pre-SOX period 
(1995-2001). Recall, however, that both our models for excess fees and IRR al- 
ready include year controls. Nevertheless, to control for the potential effects of 
SOX, we estimate excess fees separately in the pre- and post-SOX periods and 
repeat the tests. Again, no inferences are changed. 
5.4.1.5 Controllin<? for last year’s auditor fees. As a final test related to 
auditor remuneration, we repeat the analyses after controlling for last year’s audi- 
tor fees in the excess fee model (which effectively makes it a changes specifica- 
tion). Requiring data on lagged fees reduces the sample to 5,831 observations. 
EscessFer continues to be significantly and positively associated with IRR in this 
smaller sample, and the association is significant (insignificant) for stronger 
(weaker) investor protection countries. 
5.4.2 Investor Protection 
Next, we test the robustness of our Hypothesis 2 result to the choice of in- 
vestor protection measure. In particular, following Francis et al. (2006), we 
replace InvPro with the level of economic development, measured as gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita per country. As an alternative, we employ the 
security regulation measure used in Hail and Leuz (2006) instead of InvPro. 
Untabulated results show that our inferences for both Hypothesis 1 and Hypothe- 
sis 2 are unaltered. ExcessFee continues to be positively and significantly associ- 
ated with IRR after controlling for economic development (security regulation). 
The coefficient on ExcessFee for the higher economic development (security reg- 
ulation) sample is positive and significant, whereas the coefficient for the lower 
economic development (security regulation) sample is insignificant (and the dif- 
ference in coefficients is significant at the 1 percent level). 
5.4.3 Other Robustness Tests 
5.4.3 .I  Further controls for sample size differences across countries. We 
conduct additional analyses to confirm that our Hypothesis 2 results are not 
driven by sample size differences across countries. We first restrict the sample to 
countries that have at least 100 observations (leaving ten countries) and classify 
the top (bottom) five countries as stronger (weaker) investor protection. As a 
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second test, because the United States has the highest number of observations 
and is included in the stronger investor protection group, we repeat the analysis 
excluding the United States. No inferences are affected in these two sensitivity 
tests.41 
5.4.3.2 Alternative control for sample period diference. Although we 
include year indicators in all our regressions and report results excluding U.S. 
observations, our U.S. sample covers only years 2001 to 2003 due to auditor remu- 
neration data availability. This limitation can raise a concern that the U.S. sample 
is not comparable to the other samples. To this end, we reestimate our main regres- 
sion using only observations from years 2001 to 2003. In this subsample of obser- 
vations that represents all fourteen of our sample cowries, our results remain 
robust. 
5.4.3.3 Excluding firms cross-listed in the United Srures. AII non-U.S. 
firms that cross-list in the United States are exposed to the U.S. legal system 
(e.g., Hope, Kang, and Zang [2007]). Thus, as a sensitivity analysis, we exclude 
all such firms from our sample. This reduces our sample size to 8,754 observa- 
tions!* Results are similar to those reported and no inferences are affected. 
5.4.3.4 Alternative controls for auditor type. As alternative controls for 
auditor type, we first reestimate the regressions using only firms that are audited 
by Big 4 auditors ( N  = 8,057).43 Second, we control for potential endogeneity in 
Big4 using an auditor selection model similar to the one in Khurana and Raman 
(2004). No inferences are affected in these sensitivity analyses. 
5.4.3.5 Controls for analysts’ forecast bias and forecast uc~u l -cuy .  First, 
we include forecast bias as an additional control variable in our regressions. Sec- 
ond, we compute analysts’ forecast accuracy-weighted IRR estimates, giving 
more weight to observations with higher forecast accuracy and reducing the 
influence of estimates of inputs with relatively noisy inputs (see Hail and Leuz 
[2006]). For both robustness checks, inferences are unaffected. 
Collectively, the evidence presented in Tables 5-7 and the additional sensi- 
tivity analyses described above suggest that excess auditor remuneration is 
41. We also compute results for the U.S. sample alone (untabulated). The estimated coefficient 
on ExcessFee is positive (0.005) and significant at the 1 percent level (and is significantly greater 
than the coefficient for the weaker investor protection group). 
42. The percentage reduction in the sample size is almost identical between stronger and 
weaker investor protection countries. Specifically, the sample excluding cross-listed firms includes 
7,083 and 1,671 observations from stronger and weaker investor protection countries, respectively. 
43. We repeat the analysis for firms that switch (do not switch) auditor. Untabulated results 
show that ExcessFee is positive and significant in both subsamples, mitigating concerns that our 
results may be due to inadequate control for auditor switching. 
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positively associated with IRR and that this effect is more pronounced in stronger 
investor protection countries. 
6. Conclusion 
Using a sample drawn from firms in fourteen countries, this study examines 
the relation between excess auditor remuneration and the IRR on equity capital 
in global markets. We test whether IRR is affected by excess auditor remunera- 
tion through an information risk effect. We further investigate whether the 
strength of the relation between IRR and excess auditor remuneration varies sys- 
tematically with the degree of investor protection in the economy. 
Our evidence shows that (1)  excess auditor remuneration is positively associ- 
ated with IRR and (2) the positive relation between IRR and excess auditor 
remuneration is stronger in countries that have stronger investor protection envi- 
ronments. These results are robust to the inclusion of an extensive set of control 
variables and to several sensitivity analyses. 
We advance the literature in two important aspects. First, our evidence shows that 
investors demand higher rates of return for firms with abnormally high auditor remu- 
neration, consistent with the general investor view that excess auditor remuneration 
represents economic bonding between the auditor and the client. Such bonding leads 
to a less independent audit, which reduces the role of the audit in minimizing informa- 
tion risk. Second, we show that this effect varies with the degree of investor protection 
in a country. The findings are consistent with the arguments in Ball (2001), Bushman 
and Smith (2001), Francis, Khurana, and Pereira (2003), and Francis et al. (2006) that 
auditing plays a reduced role in environments that lack the “enabling” country-level 
institutions. In other words, it is primarily in environments in which those country- 
level institutions are stronger that investors tend to rely more on an audit to assess the 
quality of financial statement information. Thus, the negative effect of bonding 
between the auditor and the client firm is perceived as relatively more detrimental in 
stronger investor protection countries. 
Although we subject our findings to a battery of robustness tests, our find- 
ings should be interpreted cautiously. First, as is common in this line of research, 
it is difficult to prove causality. That is, we establish a strong case for a positive 
association between excess auditor remunerarion and the ex ante cost of equity 
capital (controlling for potential simultaneity between the two as well as control- 
ling for last year’s fees), but our tests cannot prove that increases in (excess) 
auditor remuneration cause an increase in IRR. Second, although our choice of 
investor protection variable has been used in prior research, it could proxy for 
some unknown country factor. However, we report results using alternative prox- 
ies for investor protection, and we control for country-level disclosure scores. 
Third, although we subject our measure of IRR to a number of sensitivity analy- 
ses, it could still be measured with error. Finally, our sample size is constrained 
by the availability of auditor remuneration. Thus, we cannot claim that our 
results would necessarily generalize to a broader set of firms. 
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APPENDIX A 
Measurement of the Implied Required Rate of Return 
The Residual Income Valuation Model 
Following Frankel and Lee (1998), Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan (1999). Liu, Nis- 
sim, and Thomas (2002), and Ali, Hwang, and Trombley (2003), our first residual income 
valuation (RZV) model (RIVC) assumes that the residual income is constant beyond year 
t + 2. We denote earnings per share by eps, and book value of equity per share by h, 
and represent price per share in period t as follows: 
Our second RIV model (RIVI) assumes that the return on equity (ROE) trends line- 
arly to the industry median ROE by the twelfth year and that thereafter the residual 
incomes remain constant in perpetuity (e.g., Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan [2001]). In 
the RZVI model, the current price per share is as follows: 
We make the same assumptions about the dividend payout ratio for all models as fol- 
lows. We use analysts' forecasts of dividends when available. Otherwise, we estimate the 
future dividend payout ratio by scaling dividends in the most recent year by earnings over 
the same year (or by analysts' one-year-ahead earnings forecasts for firms with negative 
earnings). We compute future book values of equity using the dividend forecasts (it' not 
available, dividend payout ratio) and analysts' earnings forecasts based on the clean sur- 
plus relation. 
Under these assumptions, we solve for r, by searching over the range of 0 to 100 per- 
cent for a value of r, that minimizes the difference between the stock prices and the 
intrinsic value estimates. 
The Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth Model 
For the Ohison and Juettner-Nauroth (OJ) model, we set the perpetual growth rate of 
the capitalized abnormal earnings growth (y - 1) to be equal to the country-specific risk- 
free interest rate minus the country-specific long-term inflation rate, or set equal to zero if 
negative (e.g., Claus and Thomas [2001]). Let dps,,, be the dividends during future pe- 
riod t + l and denote abnormal earnings growth by aeg,,, = e p ~ , + ~   r,  dps,+, - ( 1 + r,)eps,,, . 
The current price per share is then as follows: 
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Consequently the formula for the IRR is a s  follows: 
207 
where A = -  [ p l + -  ‘7’1. When ePsr+I > eps,+2, we set the short-term earnings growth 
2 
( c ~ , + 2 - c ~ . s , + 2 )  to zero. When the value inside the root is negative, we assume that the 
IRR is A.  
Thc~ PEG Model (u special case of the OJ model) 
If we assume that both y = 1 and dps,+, in the OJ model, w e  can obtain the PEG 
epst+2 - eps,, 
‘r 
model as follows (e.g., Easton [2004]): 5 = . When eps,+l> eps,+z, the  IRR is  
set as the IRK derived from the OJ model. 
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